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This essay examines Costa Lima’s rehabilitation of mimesis as production of difference 
by locating its roots in psycho- and anthropogenesis. It traces how the mimetic cathexis 
of the body and of material objects as media of communicative action is gradually shifted 
onto language. This discussion contextualises Costa Lima’s investigations into mimesis 
and the control of the imaginary, and concludes by arguing that we abandon the 
traditional binary model of imitatio in favour of a triadic model. We might then 
conceptualize mimesis in terms of a model in which the triad subjectivity – art – reality 
corresponds, at a different level of abstraction, to the triad the imaginary – the fictional – the 
real. In such a triadic model, mimesis operates through a process of mutual 
differentiation: the negotiation and exchange that takes place between subjectivity and 
reality, or the imaginary and the real, alters both poles of the triad. In a successful literary 
transference art will reshape reality under the impact of subjectivity, and alter the 
boundaries of subjectivity in contact with reality. Mediated through the fictional, the 
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‘CREATING UNREALITIES’: RETHINKING MIMESIS AS PRODUCTION OF DIFFERENCE 
 
Luiz Costa Lima's project of salvaging the concept of mimesis from ‘the ash heap of history’ presents a 
profound challenge to notions of the literary and the fictional in a wide range of historical and contemporary 
theories. In “A Proscribed Concept: Mimesis and Avant-Garde Theory” Costa Lima writes: ‘Few concepts have 
elicited such unanimous responses from literary theorists as imitatio. Not even the most intransigent defender of 
realist aesthetics would dare invoke it, fearful of his professional reputation. Indeed, from the beginnings of 
romanticism imitatio has been relegated to the ash heap of history.’i The same chapter’s last section titled 
“Mimesis as Non-Imitatio” ends with an affirmation: “One must be rather brash to keep on sailing against the 
wind.”ii  
 
In ‘sailing against the wind,’ Costa Lima has produced more than just a revisionary theory of mimesis. Recalling 
Norbert Elias’ The Civilizing Process in scope and ambition, Costa Lima’s work on mimesis presents a literary 
anthropology that combines socio- and psychohistory in order to explore literature’s impact on the cultural 
imaginary. At the core of this literary anthropology lies a concept of mimesis as production of difference rather 
than similarity. Disconnecting it from its link to the classical notion of imitatio, Costa Lima asserts its 
productive and potentially subversive rather than its affirmative force. From the outset, then, he places the 
concept of mimesis in relation to the social and to power. But rather than restaging the all too familiar assault on 
representation, referentiality and realism – a move that has been prominent in literary theory since modernist 
and avant-garde aesthetics – Costa Lima opts for reconceptualizing mimesis. Reading the literary history of 
mimesis according to a Foucaultian archeology of knowledge, he highlights the roads taken and not taken in the 
conceptualization of mimesis from the classical age to the twentieth century. Following this trajectory, he 
retraces the archaeological strata along which mimesis became disconnected from its ancient ties with poiesis 
and reduced to a concept of imitatio. Out of this archaeology of mimesis – arguably one of the most slippery but 
also most endurable concepts of literary studies – emerges Costa Lima’s own theory in which he proposes to 
reinforce the abandoned linkage of mimesis to poiesis, thus emphasizing its creative and transformative power. 
Embedded within a larger anthropology of literature, this theory synthesizes the role of mimesis in the genesis 
of the subject, the processes of socialization and acculturation, and the dynamics of cultural contact. 
 
One of Costa Lima’s fundamental premises is that mimesis does not organize the world in terms of perception 
but ‘organizes it in terms of the imaginary.’iii This perspective changes aesthetics ‘from a system of normative 
values into a branch of anthropological investigation aiming at understanding the poetic experience.’iv 
Considering the emphasis Costa Lima places on the anthropological function of literature, aesthetics and 
mimesis, it may be helpful to recall the crucial role mimesis plays in anthropogenesis as well as the genesis of 
the subject. Anthropologists have long recognized mimesis as an integral part of anthropogenesis. Creating 
symbols and symbolic systems that shape and organize ‘the real’ in a meaningful and collectively accessible 
way, mimesis occupies a transitional position between the subject and his or her world, between inside and 
outside. Mimesis is the social and cultural force that operates in the creation and particular formation of ‘inner 
spaces,’ that is, spaces in which what is received from the outside is processed according to both cultural and 
personal parameters. Thus located in a transitional ‘space between,’ mimesis facilitates a kind of exchange 
between outside and inside, partaking in both the processing of the outer world and the projection of the inner 
world. Rather than producing imitations of the outer world (one of the two main archaeological strata that, 
according to Costa Lima, historically define the poetic), mimesis transforms the real through symbolic codes 
and images. The central function of mimesis in anthropogenesis is therefore not imitation, but mediation. 
 
Mimesis operates initially as a form of corporeal knowledge, a digital speech intimately tied to the body. As 
such it also manifests itself as performative knowledge and action. In an essay on “Mimesis in 
Anthropogenesis” anthropologists Gebauer und Wulf write: 
 
The infant’s relationship to his own body, to other human beings, to the environment and to language 
develops through mimetic processes. These constitute the first forms of interaction with others, the world 
and the self in the course of which the child makes itself similar to its opposite. These early mimetic 
processes already reveal an active relationship to the world in which there is at the same time a high 
degree of openness and receptivity.v 
 
In a similar vein, in Control of the Imaginary, Costa Lima quotes psychoanalytic critic Sergio Paulo Rouanet: 
‘The theory of identification is literally a theory of mimesis – a making-oneself-like through appropriation, be it 




Psychoanalytic notions of mimesis play an important role in the construction of Costa Lima’s own model 
because in psychoanalytic theories of subject genesis, the central function of mimesis is not derived from 
imitatio. Instead, imitation and similarity are important only within a much broader concept of mimesis as a 
process of transformation. Costa Lima interprets Rouanet’s passage as follows: ‘Even when similarity to the 
model is visual, it is not that visuality that is its basis; what is essential is not its nature as copy or substantative 
trace but the process of transformation that is in operation.'’vii And he concludes: ‘What is decisive in the 
constitution of mimesis, then, is the creation of a staging, which is not so much the repetition of a model as the 
organization of a response to that model carried out at the level of the sensorial.’viii In this vein, Costa Lima 
combines and elaborates both the performative role mimesis plays in anthropogenesis and the transformational 
role it plays in the genesis of the subject. The function of mimesis as performative action and knowledge, as 
well as its role as a transformational agent in the cultural production of difference, are retained as the most 
fundamental mimetic operations. 
 
Within psychogenesis, mimesis is crucial in the so-called mirror-phase most thoroughly theorized by D. W. 
Winnicott.ix In this phase, the infant’s whole environment of care with its particular rhythms and aesthetics 
functions as a mirroring device. Thus being ‘mirrored’ by a yet undifferentiated flow of first received sensations 
– sounds, forms and colours, touches and smells – the infant mimetically processes them. Traces of these 
undifferentiated sensations form part of an early memory, a first mode of ‘unthought knowledge’x that operates 
in later life as an organizing matrix or – as Christopher Bollas calls it –  a ‘grammar of being.’ Even at this early 
stage, mimesis functions less through imitation than through creation. Being much more important as a 
formative than a reflective agency, the mirror produces difference in the sense that it helps to create a gestalt for 
hitherto undifferentiated sensations. We may also recall here Lacan’s emphasis on the anticipatory and 
formative role of the image as an agency of gestaltung in the mirror phase. Instead of functioning as the infant’s 
mere double, the mirror image projects a gestalt that, in turn, anticipates a development and thus becomes an 
important agent of transformation. There is, in other words, a certain anticipatory, if not Utopian, element 
operative in mimesis that propels change rather than stability and therefore lends itself to the potentially 
disruptive and subversive power of mimesis. 
 
We also find evidence of this anticipatory function in anthropogenesis, namely in the use of mimesis in magic 
practices and rituals.xi In the magic relation to the world and to nature, humans mimetically anticipate an effect 
they aim to create, hoping to transfer the power of their anticipatory mimetic act onto the object they desire to 
affect. Again, the emphasis lies on action, intervention and the production of difference rather than on a mere 
imitation of nature. In a magic world, mimetic functions are usually tied to the body and its forms of expression, 
or to material objects that serve as symbols or extensions of the body. These roots of mimetic functions in a 
performative language of the body help fully to understand the formative role mimesis plays in the production of 
culture more generally. When, during the mirror phase, the body serves as a medium of communicative action, 
corporeal utterances already tacitly transmit cultural meanings before the infant’s acquisition of language 
proper. It is in this sense that we could say with Walter Benjamin, whom Costa Lima quotes, that language ‘has 
precedence. Not just in relation to meaning. Also in relation to the self.’xii Language, we may conclude, operates 
long before the infant’s entry into the symbolic order and its active use of words as carriers of meaning. Like 
corporeal rhythms, the rhythms of language are also used mimetically to structure spaces and times of 
communicative action. At a more intimate level, these utterances also convey to the child an early sense of 
becoming: the ways in which it is held, looked at, talked to, are formative as mimetic devices that establish the 
earliest modes and moods of a self in formation. The body is used, as Gebauer and Wulf demonstrate, like a 
musical instrument able to touch by generating vibrations, rhythms and sounds, thus creating resonances in the 
receiver that will eventually translate into a structure of anticipation and response.xiii Already in anthropogenesis 
mimesis then operates, as Costa Lima claims for mimesis in general, as performative utterance and 
communicative action. 
 
This mimetic cathexis of the body and of material objects as media of communicative action is gradually shifted 
onto language. With the advent of print culture, the sensory elements of mimesis are sublimated in multiple 
codifications as writing, disrupting the intimate, unmediated connection of mimesis to the corporeal, to sounds, 
rhythms, gestures. However, cultural objects – and among them especially the aesthetic objects of literature and 
the arts – continue to reactivate these ties to the performative utterances of the body, thus asserting the 
productive, transformative, performative and communicative dimensions of mimesis. The shift of mimetic 
functions from the body onto language foregrounds how mimesis operates through resonance and attunement. 
We could say that the mimetic functions of language that recall the traces of early corporeal sensations and 
experiences – the whole sphere that Kristeva calls the ‘semiotic’xiv – facilitate those aspects of communication 
that include affect and emotion, desire and pleasure. Most importantly, perhaps, they may convey certain moods 
in language that resonate with our earliest modes of being.xv When, for example, the mother begins to verbalize 
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the infant’s needs she repeats what she sees the child express by transposing it into language. Even though one 
could argue that she ‘imitates’ the infant’s needs in a different medium of expression, the main goal of this 
repetition is transformation because it initiates the long process of a ‘word-forming experience.’xvi It is in this 
process that the sensory elements of mimesis are displaced from the body onto language. Language, however, is 
endowed with an ability to retain and even codify the sensory traces of, for example, the sounds of a voice and 
the rhythms of a body. This is why language is also able to create a space of resonance for sensory experience. 
Throughout history, poetry has used its mimetic functions in order to foreground the sensory dimensions of 
language. Even the magic cathexis of material objects can be transferred to language so that, in their mimetic 
use, words may assume a magic power. 
 
The mimetic use of language as a space of resonance and attunement, however, returns us to a problem that has 
been at the heart of numerous controversies among competing theories of mimesis, namely the problem of 
similarity and difference. Similarity is the most crucial condition for creating resonance between objects, 
persons or cultures that are brought into contact. Without resonance we would not live in a world of difference 
but on the contrary, in a world of absolute indifference. How then can resonance and similarity be conceived in 
a theory in which mimesis does not figure as imitatio but as production of difference? This question is central to 
Costa Lima’s reflections on mimesis in contemporary literature, art, philosophy and theory. Ultimately it is the 
problem of resonance that motivates him to shift his understanding of mimesis and similarity from a model of 
perception to a model of communication. Reader response and reception theories, as well as theories of 
communicative action and discourse analysis, allow him to disconnect the notions of mimesis and similarity 
from imitatio and to reconnect it with poiesis. Similarity is accordingly perceived as a communicative device 
designed to create resonance with objects outside language and thus to act as a medium of connection. It is 
certainly no coincidence that Costa Lima frames these reflections by defining the role of mimesis in 
socialization and subject genesis: 
 
I have said that apparently every phenomenon is received by a human agent according to a set of 
expectations, based on the specific culture of which the agent is part. That is, in the subject-object 
relation, the object is captured by means of a net that is not the invention of an individual, but that 
imposes itself on all as a condition for their socialization. (Of course, this is not to deny that there are 
individual variants within the common net.) However great the variability of each individual response or 
internalization, each member of a culture – and, within a culture, of each of its segments – is recognized 
in opposition to the “foreigner,” that is, the one who has been given a different form of socialization.xvii 
 
This statement may help to clarify why Costa Lima synthesizes subject genesis, acculturation, and cultural 
contact in his anthropological model of literary mimesis. The very use of mimesis in the genesis of the subject 
is, as Costa Lima suggests, already pervaded by the relations of value and power that mark every process of 
acculturation. 
 
The infant’s early environment conveys both a practice of care pervaded by values and taboos, power and 
control, as well as a more personal aesthetics of care through which ‘individual variants’ enter the common net. 
The earliest cultural structuring of object relations is thus both deeply cultural and highly personal. Relations of 
power are defined by the relationship of infant and adult, by the mother’s socio-cultural position, the family 
structure and whole set of cultural values, expectations and practices that enter the early environment of care.  
Even patterns of cultural contact are relevant in this process since, as Costa Lima rightly points out, ‘each 
member of a culture is recognized in opposition to the ‘foreigner.’’ We may therefore assume that during the 
mirror phase, the infant also acquires the earliest patterns of cultural contact prevalent in the culture into which 
it is born. Mimesis is crucial to understand these early processes of subject formation because it relies on 
similarity as a device of recognition and selection. ‘Similarity – that is, the actualization of an internalized stock 
of expectations – acts as a selector,’ writes Costa Lima, ‘sometimes more flexible, sometimes less, that enables 
us to convert experiences into representations. Similarity allows us to find echoes in the world, the basis of that 
redundance without which everything would seem strange to us.’xviii As we have seen, during the mirror phase 
mimesis operates largely through attunement and resonance. Later in life, we may use the mimetic power of 
cultural objects such as literature and the arts to ‘find echoes in the world.’ 
 
In Costa Lima’s model, literature and aesthetic objects in general facilitate a communication that operates 
through similarity, resonance, and the production of difference. It is this production of difference that protects 
one from mere negativity in response to cultural alterity. Costa Lima identifies two forms of responding 
negatively to alterity and cultural difference – one is to reduce alterity to the already expected, thus producing an 
unending series of identical responses; the other is aggressively to reduce alterity to entropic noise beyond any 
possibility of connection.xix Mimesis counteracts this negativity by facilitating the organization of the world in 
terms of the imaginary. The partners in ‘poetic communication,’ Costa Lima insists, ‘must be equally active – 
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that is, both must activate the imaginary.’xx Seen in this way, the activation of the imaginary is used as a devise 
to cope productively with alterity and cultural difference. ‘Activating the imaginary’ means responding to a 
resonance between otherwise heterogeneous if not alien worlds, objects or experiences. It also means to process 
alterity without succumbing to paranoia or aggressive indifference. 
 
But what exactly does Costa Lima mean when he says that mimesis organizes the world in terms of the 
imaginary? This formulation bears further examination because it locates Costa Lima’s particular notion of 
similarity and difference within his critical exchange with other theories. His remark that mimesis is able to 
provide a productive way of coping with alterity already suggests the trajectory for a possible answer. The two 
negative reactions Costa Lima highlights are, as it turns out, identical with the most extreme manifestations of 
similarity and difference: alterity is either reduced to the already known, the identical, or it is reduced to utter, 
irreducible difference. The productive relation to alterity and, by extension, cultural difference depends, in other 
words, on a particular space and mode of mediation. Literature and its use of mimesis, Costa Lima suggests, 
function to provide such a space. 
 
The concept of mediation suggests a topography of inside and outside, subject and world, thought and 
expression – vexed notions, in other words, that have been discarded for similar reasons as the notion of 
mimesis. Furthermore, if mediation is what makes difference accessible, it is also linked to representation as yet 
another vexed notion. The touchstone for Costa Lima’s revision of these concepts is his critique of Deleuze’s 
Repetition and Difference. Instead of following Deleuze in rejecting representation as stasis, Costa Lima argues 
it must be rethought as a process of vital production. ‘The prohibition of representation ends up compromising 
the very existence of the subject, making him unable to elaborate alterity.’xxi To elaborate alterity, Costa Lima 
further concludes, the subject needs to form an interior space for the incorporation of others, ‘a solitary space, 
that is, a space inhabited by his thoughts and representations.’xxii Intimately connected to, but at the same time 
separate and protected from the outside, such a space operates as a precondition for communication and cultural 
contact. Or, as Costa Lima writes: ‘And without solitude no contact with the other is possible. Empty inside, 
unable – as in the Amazonian myth analyzed by Levi-Strauss – to have a “stomach” in which the “food” 
ingested could be stored, he is unable to participate in situations of communication.’xxiii 
 
Recalling the attack on representation in French theory, Costa Lima shows that, for Deleuze, representation 
remains subordinate to ‘the form of identity’ and is therefore seen as an operation that stiffens movement and 
transforms ‘flight’ into a fixed portrait. Repetition, on the other hand, is seen as conforming to the motion that 
takes place between phenomenon and subject. Against this overly static notion of representation, Costa Lima 
takes recourse to Andre Green’s psychoanalytic model in which representation figures as a dynamic process. 
‘Representation, to the extent that it is not a perception passively received but rather a created form, is a product 
of the transformation of perception, the result of a psychical elaboration of thought.’xxiv The inability to 
elaborate the real through its transformation into a symbolic structure would, by contrast, lead to a psychotic 
paralysis of thought. Costa Lima evaluates Green’s position in light of his own theory: 
 
In short, the representations subsumed into the self – into the cleft self – are multiple and conflicting, and 
every organization they submit to in a self is, in principle provisional. But to discard them categorically, 
for the sake of the exclusiveness of repetition and difference, would lead, as in the exemplary case 
analyzed by Green, to the paralysis of thought – or, what is even more serious, to providing arguments in 
favor of a society in which the absence of the individualized self would only correspond to an 
amorphous mass of catalogued sets, masses of electronically stimulated voices.xxv  
 
Cast as a particular mode of processing or elaborating the real, mimesis produces difference within an horizon 
of similarity. Representation then becomes a dynamic category, just as ‘the real’ itself is a sliding ground of 
difference rather than a clearly delineated static territory. Rather than imitating the real through fictional 
doubles, the elaboration of the real through symbolic representation produces alterity and difference. A subject 
unable to elaborate alterity remains psychotically disconnected from the social world; a society that precludes 
the provisional stabilization of flexible unities and individuals reduces its modes of communication to ‘a passage 
among shadows.’xxvi 
 
The space in which mimesis operates is thus intimately connected to the space of ‘interior’ representations and 
incorporations or, as Costa Lima calls it, the ‘solitary space’ of the subject. Due to its intermediate position 
between the outer and the inner world, mimesis represents the real as a ‘created form’ – a form that facilitates 
the processing of the real as difference. Seen in this way, literature opens up a space in which the images, 
moods, thoughts, phantasms and incorporations created in the solitary inner space can be brought back into an 
exchange or communication with the social world. In order to be accessible and made communicable within the 
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symbolic order, these inner representations need to be shaped according to shared symbols, forms and 
codifications. 
 
For Costa Lima, mimesis operates as such a shaping force. In order to elaborate this notion of the transformative 
power of mimesis, he draws on Paul Klee’s theory of art. Art, Klee believes, must explore the unconscious 
through a ‘deliberate mediation of formativeness (Gestaltung).’xxvii This is why he pursues the goal to free art 
from forms commanded by ‘representational’ figuration. Understood in experimental, non-figurative terms, 
‘formativeness’ bestows meaning on the unconscious that would otherwise remain too private or 
undifferentiated. While Klee rejects representation because he ties it to conscious figuration, Costa Lima uses 
Green’s dynamic model to show that representation may after all be linked to the ‘mediation of formativeness’ 
required to explore the unconscious in art or literature. Elaborating the unconscious through ‘formativeness,’ 
however, means to transform it. This transformational function of mimesis, Costa Lima argues, can only be 
described in an interactive model. Both the producer (writer) and the recipient (reader) must activate the 
imaginary in order to use the potential of literary or artistic ‘form’ to engender a transformational process. 
 
The activation of the imaginary and the exploration of the unconscious through art occurs, I would argue, within 
a process of literary transference. If mimesis uses similarity in processing the real, it is in order to retain a 
resonance between outer and inner worlds rather than to subsume one to an imitation of the other. Transference 
means precisely this: forms are processed according to a resonance they may produce consciously or 
unconsciously. Transference, in turn, may assume different directions in relation to the resonating object. 
Literary objects may draw their effects from such diverse uses of similarity as a familiar or disturbing 
resonance, a resonance that works according to subliminal recognition, and yet another that works through the 
mind games of literary self-reflexivity. In engaging literary forms, the reader, on the other hand, may simply 
enforce such resonance or else work it through, transform it, and shape its cultural ramifications along different 
parameters. It is through such processes of exchange and transference that mimesis engages in reshaping the 
cultural imaginary. Klee’s insistence that, in art, the exploration of the unconscious will not be fruitful if there is 
no deliberate ‘mediation of formativeness’ must be supplemented by the observation that the fruitful exploration 
of the unconscious equally depends on the recipient’s processing of such ‘formativeness.’ If literary form thus 
operates at the very centre of mimesis and literary transference, it is the response to form that determines how 
fruitful the exploration of the formed material will become. 
 
As we have seen, Costa Lima’s concept of mimesis and representation is directed against their conventional 
categorization in literary theory and aesthetics. Arguing that this categorization emerges from a reductive 
reading, Costa Lima reintroduces mimesis and representation as dynamic categories in order to demonstrate 
their usefulness in a postmodern frame of thought. Representation then assumes a much larger meaning than the 
‘representational figuration’ rejected by modernism and the avant-garde. Even the strangest and least 
‘representational’ objects gain meaning in relation to a ‘stock of cultural expectations’ and thus become 
represented as objects: 
 
Indeed, it is by means of this stock of expectations that we approach natural and cultural phenomena and 
select them so that we can evaluate them. The internalization of this stock, then, is not an individual 
“option,” but a consequence of the fact that the individual is part of the group in which he is socialized. . 
. .  Depending on our expectations, the object or phenomenon is perceived as identical when nothing in it 
diverges from the organizing expectation; as similar when it more or less allows an analogy with our 
expectations; as different when the discrepancy outweighs the expectations; and as hostile when the 
structure of what stands before us cannot be codified by our expectations. Perhaps every contact between 
a human being and what is found around him or her – “phantom” things or other beings – takes place 
within these parameters.xxviii 
 
Literary transference, I would argue, does not simply fall within these parameters; it elaborates them in turn, 
thus reshaping our patterns of cultural contact along with our relation to ‘phantom things’ and to the cultural 
imaginary. In Control of the Imaginary, Costa Lima writes: 
 
It is possible, then, to enter into communication with the fictional only when one learns to see it as a 
whole that one’s imagination invokes. Or, rather, when one receives messages structured less through 
utterances than through images. . . . While the imaginary presupposes the destruction of reality – that is, 
abandonment of the thematization of perception grounded in that concept – creating a diffuse magma in 
which anything can signify anything, aesthetic experience involves the negation of the negation of the 
imaginary: my interpretation of the poetry that I read cannot be strictly my own but must be formulated 




Once again we encounter the notion that reworking the imaginary requires a transposition into literary form. In 
order to become effective, this form may use mimesis to produce a resonance in the reader. One could argue that 
literary transference uses mimesis as an aesthetic equivalent to the blank screen. Yet, while in the 
psychoanalytic encounter the blank screen invites unconscious projection and transference, the ‘screen of 
mimesis’ does more: it provides a gestalt that resonates with a cultural memory based on corporeal traces and 
sensations, as well as more conscious cultural images and codes. Since even the traces of the corporeal are 
marked by the symbolic order and thus culturally coded, the resonating screen of mimesis also reflects the 
earliest marks of culture along with later cultural codifications. 
 
The framework of mimesis as a formational and transformational operation points to a dimension in Costa 
Lima’s theory that may well be his foremost concern: a defence of fiction and its anthropological as well as 
cultural function. Creating a space within the symbolic order of language for the mediation of the subject’s 
relationship to its outer and inner spaces, mimesis is intimately tied to tradition and power. Power and control 
shape the different uses of the imaginary and the fictional throughout history, pervading every exchange 
between the subject and the world, including all mediation of alterity and cultural difference. Costa Lima opens 
his analysis of power in Control of the Imaginary with a spectacular discovery that ultimately shapes his theory 
of mimesis as a defence of fiction. It is the discovery that, paradoxically, at the heart of many theories of the 
poetic lies ‘a scandalous prohibition: a prohibition of fiction itself.’xxx 
 
Tracing its roots back to the Middle Ages, Costa Lima pursues the trajectory of this prohibition to the very 
present. To a certain extent, both The Dark Side of Reason and Limits of the Voice are still concerned with 
providing an answer to the question first posed in Control of the Imaginary: ‘with what interests did this 
supposed prohibition correlate?’ The answer is that fiction is linked to the formation of subjectivity and the 
threat posed by fiction lies in the very recognition of subjectivity. Accordingly, the control of the imaginary 
translates into a control of subjectivity. Costa Lima demonstrates in detail for every major period in literary 
history that the control of the imaginary, as well as the power of and over literature, have always been linked to 
subjectivity. Manifesting itself in complex processes of exchange between subjects, worlds, cultures and 
politics, this dynamic of power and control also seeps into theories of the poetic. There it can either simply be 
reproduced or, if made the object of investigation, opened to a challenge that may ultimately lead to a different 
cultural use of the imaginary. Drawing on Howard Bloch's Medieval French Literature and Law, Costa Lima 
traces the ‘prohibition of fiction’ back to the Middle Ages where, as Bloch demonstrates, the recognition of 
subjectivity begins in the twelfth century. Literature supports this recognition with the appearance of the 
singular hero in late epic and lyrical forms, as well as with the valorisation of the individual within the courtly 
novel and lyric. The advent of print culture only enforces this increasingly flexible recognition of subjectivity: 
‘the flexibilizing strategies then introduced, all of which revolved around the issue of subjectivity, were favored 
by the subsequent development and expansion of the printing press.’xxxi 
 
We find a curious contradiction here. If Bloch is right, the Middle Ages were obviously in need of ‘flexibilizing 
strategies’ and hence a recognition of subjectivity. That very recognition, however, seems to pose a threat of a 
different kind that is, in turn, translated into a need to control the imaginary by placing a tacit prohibition on 
fiction. It is this contradiction that begins to manifest itself in the poetic theories of the time. The assumption of 
a contradiction may further explain why, if fiction supports cultural flexibility, it is nonetheless perceived as 
posing a threat that must be answered by its prohibition. If all strategies that retain cultural flexibility are tied to 
the vexing issue of the recognition of subjectivity, then the threat results from fiction’s negotiation of the 
boundaries between subjectivity and culture. Operating in this space of negotiation, power manifests itself in a 
struggle over the boundaries that differentiate subjects from cultures. Yet, it is absolutely crucial here to notice 
that the recognition of subjectivity can only pose a threat within a culture that already figures subjectivity as its 
other. The prohibition of fiction furthermore reveals that, even if used for purposes of acculturation, fiction is 
already tacitly linked to subjectivity, and that, accordingly, its recognition through fiction is perceived as 
culturally subversive. Ultimately, I think, Costa Lima’s recuperation of mimesis can also be read as an attempt 
to show that the threat perceived in the recognition of subjectivity is related to a misreading similar to the one 
that led to the conventional reductive theories of mimesis. In both cases, the reductive conceptualization stems 
from an agonistic polarization of subjectivity, politics and culture. 
 
Historicizing the prohibition of fiction in Western poetics and aesthetic theories, Costa Lima establishes a link to 
a cultural need for strategies that help to mediate the recognition of subjectivity in times of crisis. If the latter 
occur whenever a culture’s social order and mental structures threaten to rigidify, the prohibition appears as a 
symptom of a deep cultural ambivalence, if not a cultural paradox of sorts. Mediating strategies – among which 
Costa Lima singles out literary mimesis as the most crucial – help to retain or restore the cultural flexibility 
necessary for a dynamic culture. But they do this only if they produce difference instead of identity, sameness, 
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and imitation. By contrast, theories that harbour a prohibition of the poetic try to shackle it to notions of reality, 
identity and imitation. Their ‘misreading’ lies in the fact that they tie identity and imitatio to cultural stability. 
Costa Lima’s historical readings rather suggest the opposite. It is true that, in supporting cultural change, 
mimesis as a production of difference undermines the status quo. This is how mimesis unfolds its subversive 
potential. Ultimately, however, this very process will contribute to cultural stability precisely because it 
increases the flexibility of cultural boundaries. Literary mimesis appears here as a mediating strategy that 
negotiates cultural boundaries and creates cultural stability by maintaining flexibility and change. Such a 
reading relies on a rather contemporary systemic notion of culture that could be embraced in a wide range of 
theories from systems theory and cybernetics to an ‘ecology of mind.’xxxii At the same time, this structural 
conceptualization places literary mimesis in a highly ambivalent relation to power: precisely by challenging the 
status quo, mimesis may paradoxically enhance a culture’s ability to avert crisis. That cultures nonetheless 
perceive the fictional as a threat can only happen within a history in which subjectivity and culture have become 
polarized, if not antagonistic. Theories that reproduce this rigid polarization of subjectivity and culture in their 
understanding of mimetic processes tend to ontologize an agonistic relationship that has developed historically – 
presumably even for good reasons – but can therefore not automatically claim universal validity. 
 
Costa Lima traces this polarization all the way to the surrealists’ rejection of the cultural status quo. Their turn 
against the ‘invisible but effective wall of good sense, the prejudices of factualism, the middle ground that was 
the aim of realism,’ can then also be read as a response to the prohibition of fiction. However, their respective 
desire to ‘attack, by every possible means, the ‘civilized’ taming of mind and life,’xxxiii maintains, and perhaps 
even enforces, the very polarization on which the prohibition was based in the first place. Due to its mistaken 
equation with imitatio, mimesis appears to the proponents of avant-garde aesthetics as too compromised by its 
ties to the real. Imitatio, however, had long become inadequate in relation to the institutions of modern life and 
therefore needed to be replaced by a more adequate and complex notion of mimetic processes. As valid as the 
surrealist revolt was historically, it fails to provide a productive model to theorize the relationship between a 
culture and its aesthetic practices. A theory that locates these practices ‘outside’ of culture ignores the processes 
of exchange that take place between the cultural and the aesthetic, thus denying the effects of aesthetic practices 
within culture.  
 
From this perspective, the anti-mimetic affect of avant-garde aesthetics appears as the result of an overly rigid 
separation of culture and aesthetics. Costa Lima points out that, while avant-garde theories, and twentieth 
century aesthetics more generally, simply abandoned the concern with mimesis, this concern was taken up by 
psychoanalysis. ‘Psychoanalysis, one might say, is born of the horizon of inquiry opened up by the romantics. 
That inquiry was decisive in demonstrating that reason, as it was conceived in classical thought and classical 
poetics, could not serve as an explanatory criterion for art. Reason sets up conscious models to be internalized 
through either direct or sublimate action. It therefore confuses them with the reality to be imitated.’xxxiv 
Ironically, psychoanalysis develops the framework that avant-garde aesthetics would have needed for their 
interest in aesthetically exploring the unconscious. It is in psychoanalytic theories that mimesis is opened up for 
a use that engages not only reason but ‘the dark side of reason’ as well. No longer shackled to the province of 
‘everyday reality,’ it is freed to access and mediate the ‘provinces of dream, of art, of religion.’ Costa Lima 
interprets this revision of mimesis in terms of the previously mentioned shift from perception to imagination. 
While in everyday reality, he argues, perception operates as the dominant principle for the organization of 
experience, the ‘sub-provinces’ of dream, art and religion invert this dominance and privilege imagination over 
perception. This view is consistent with Freud’s notion of reality testing and Winnicott’s notion that one may 
not challenge what is produced or experienced in the transitional space. Accordingly, mimesis has a different 
status in everyday life than it has in literature. Costa Lima argues for a specific definition of literary mimesis as 
an operation within ‘the province of art’: ‘day-to-day mimesis operates within the province of everyday reality, 
thus obeying laws necessarily different from those governing artistic experience.’xxxv 
 
In God of Many Names, Mihai Spariosu reminds us that already Aristotle distinguishes between two kinds of 
mimesis: ‘mimesis as learning and poetic mimesis. There is the pleasure of mimesis as cognition, employed in 
the process of learning and reserved for the useful arts and philosophy; and there is the pleasure of mimesis as 
recognition, which comes the closest to the pleasure of poetic mimesis. The first derives from learning about the 
model, the second from having previous knowledge about it.’xxxvi The transitional space in which literary 
mimesis operates may, however, use and engage mimesis both as cognition and recognition. Using resonance, 
literary mimesis may mobilize a previous knowledge and transform it according to laws specific to the poetic. It 
is in this sense that we can speak of a particular literary knowledge. Literary knowledge hardly ever functions 
directly as a transmission of information; it rather works by detour, indirection, and multiple mediation. In other 
words, literary knowledge constitutes itself in relation to the everyday, or to the reader’s subjectivity, via the 
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detour of multiple references to previous literary and cultural knowledge. Moreover, it constitutes itself via the 
indirection proper to literary form. 
 
Granting to literary mimesis a ‘specific definition,’ requires that we abandon the traditional binary model of 
imitatio in favour of a triadic model. We might then conceptualize mimesis in terms of a model in which the 
triad subjectivity – art – reality corresponds, at a different level of abstraction, to the triad the imaginary – the 
fictional – the real. In such a triadic model, mimesis operates through a process of mutual differentiation: the 
negotiation and exchange that takes place between subjectivity and reality, or the imaginary and the real, alters 
both poles of the triad. In a successful literary transference art will reshape reality under the impact of 
subjectivity and alter the boundaries of subjectivity in contact with reality. Mediated through the fictional, the 
imaginary will accordingly have a changing impact on the real and vice versa.xxxvii 
 
I will end with a short speculation that takes up the contemporary assault on representation, referentiality and 
realism mentioned at the beginning. Costa Lima’s insistence that mimesis is inextricably tied to something 
traditionally called ‘reality’ is grounded in a mobilization of both categories. In reconceptualizing mimesis, he 
has inevitably also changed the traditional connotations of the term ‘reality.’ If he at times seems to prefer ‘the 
real’ – perhaps in reference to Lacan and Althusser – it is probably because this term is less prone to the 
essentialisms traditionally attached to ‘reality.’ Alluding to the fact that we can never access the real without 
symbolic mediations, Althusser defines it as an absent cause. In the same vein, Costa Lima casts the real as a 
sliding ground of difference. He reconceptualizes the relationship between mimesis and reality in light of the 
current crisis of immanentist poetics. Following his trajectory, we might ask whether the fashionable prohibition 
of the real and referentiality in postmodern thought might not be yet another version of the prohibition of fiction. 
While it appears to grant exclusive priority to the fictional, the dictum that literature only refers to itself in 
endless spirals of self-referentiality and intertextuality ultimately obliterates its ties to the culture in which it is 
produced, or the cultures in which it is received. Would it not be possible then to ask if, accordingly, the current 
obsession with self-referentiality is not perhaps a postmodern version of an inverse ‘control of the imaginary’? 
Does the exclusive attention to self-referentiality and intertextual play not divert any attention possibly directed 
toward the ‘process of exchange’ facilitated by the fictional, thus eclipsing its production of alterity and 
difference within culture? Contemporary literature’s flourishing display of self-reflexive mind games and 
intertextual play must not mean that it has given up its ties to the real. Rather it seems to respond to a cultural 
need to explore the status of referentiality in a media culture that has dramatically changed the conditions under 
which it is produced. Certainly, the current implosion of the cultural imaginary and the respective difficulties in 
distinguishing the real from its various modes of simulation warrants a reconceptualization of referentiality and, 
more generally, of literature’s relation to the real. But instead of placing a prohibition on the category of the real 
– an inverse mirror image of the prohibition of fiction – it might be more productive to insist on the ‘particular 
definition’ of the literary and recognize its organization according to laws different from those that govern the 
real. 
 
We might conclude then that neither the conflation of the fictional with the real, nor the complete severance of 
the two, are viable options for a vital relationship between a culture and its aesthetic practices. Placing a 
prohibition on the real within a theory of the poetic is as reductive as placing a prohibition on fiction. If, by 
introducing difference, fiction mobilizes the imaginary and thereby negotiates the boundaries between 
subjectivity and culture, we may understand why certain cultures display a strong interest to control the 
imaginary. But to control it completely – a control that would amount to a successful prohibition of fiction – 
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